120 Million Brazilians Can’t Be Wrong

Was the 2014 World Cup Good for Brazil?

In June 2014, just days out from kick-off, 61% of Brazilians said that they didn't think the FIFA World Cup was a good thing for Brazil, because it took money away from public services. Given that Brazil's population exceeds 200 million that means 123 million people - five times the population of Australia - were unhappy about a sporting mega-event that was sold to them by a government ostensibly representing the working class. How is it that such a huge economic development opportunity let down so many?

Traditional economic development theory holds that a nation's growth will create monetary returns for the poor however, many studies have shown this to not necessarily be the case. In fact "inequality of opportunity is both wasteful and inimical to sustainable development and poverty reduction." For a dozen years Brazil has now been run by the Partido dos Trabalhadores -- the Workers Party. The beginnings of the Workers Party were deeply rooted in the anti-capitalist class struggle. How is it then that so many Brazilians - a large section of which are presumably workers - think that a mega-event such as the World Cup is not a good thing and will only take money away from schools, health care and other public services? 

Surely the 3.12 million new jobs created in the construction industry in 2013 alone, 35 new rail projects touted by Brazilian officials in the bid and the projected 3.5 million international tourists expected to flood the dozen host cities could only be a good thing for the average Jose on the ground? When considered in isolation from one another, the myriad reasons underpinning such widespread dissatisfaction are not particularly complicated. Combine and compare them against the purported benefits, and it becomes clear that not only was the World Cup not a good thing for Brazil but that it was in fact demonstrably bad. Disappointment in a leadership that promised great hopes to a working class majority and a litany of human rights abuses including the exploitation of workers’ rights, forced evictions and police brutality worked together to create an environment of anger and fear that no amount of football fever could distract from.

Inacio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, is widely considered to be the first genuine working class leader of a South American nation. However Lula's anointed successor, President Dilma Rousseff now leads a party that to the casual observer, appears to have abandoned its working class roots in favour of re-election compromise deals. Upon his ascendancy to power in 2002, supporters amongst trade unions, workers collectives and academics expected that Lula would be more radical than he was later proven to be. Indeed, his first budget saw the creation of a new ministry aimed at, amongst other things, reducing poverty and combating hunger.

However, the Party had already faced two electoral losses so that by the time of the 2002 poll, compromise deals had already been made with business interests that won over broader voter support. Consequently neither Lula nor the Party were anything like they had been. That is, in order to win wider electoral favour, Lula "distanced himself from his working class beginnings and immersed himself in the new myth of the "middle class"". Neo-liberal policies designed to garner donor support from big business, such as allowing large-scale rural landholding to continue, generous incentives to agribusiness and support for private pensions continued to build on Brazil's capitalist economy. Subsequently there was little gained in the way of real change for the working classes.

According to Amado Cervo, "Brazil associates human rights with development and [under] Lula... action [was] taken through social programs such as the Bolsa Familia (Family Fund)." The allocation of budget funds to social welfare programs, in the form of the Family Fund, assisted 3.6 million families in its first year of operation following Lula's initial election. Following his second win, by 2009 it had increased to 15 million families assisted. This remarkable rise in assistance is credited to Lula broadening eligibility in order to bolster his support lost during his first term due to an impeachment crisis.

Ricardo Attunes suggests that Lula was only "permitted" by the powerful rich to survive that crisis because of his government's economic policies supporting the interests of capital. However that support consequently meant Lula could no longer depend on wide sections of the organised working class who had become disillusioned by his and the Party's actions. Thus it is reasonable to argue that the huge increase in social welfare funding, which was really only worth approximately $30 US a month, was nothing more than a handout that bought the votes of "the most impoverished social strata."

In pimping the World Cup, Brazil officials promised the populace 35 new rail projects. By the time the crowds had started to arrive, just five projects had reached completion and one worker was killed in the construction. In 2010 there were 55,000 work related accidents in Brazil. By 2012 that number had risen to 62,000. Nine men were killed in the construction of twelve new stadiums, four of which are predicted to be white elephants with little further use to the communities once the mega sporting carnival has left town. (Figure2)

Figure 2: Costs of building 12 new Brazil World Cup stadiums.

STADIUM	COST IN REAIS	GAMES	RATING FOR FUTURE USE + NOTES
Belo Horizonte	695m (£220m)	6	4 - Likely. Two local clubs draw large crowds.
Brasilia	1.4bn (£460m)	7	4 - Unlikely. Local clubs draw small crowds
Cuiaba	Est.600m (£195m)	4	2 - Unlikely. Local clubs draw small crowds
Curitiba	180m (£56m)	4	4 - Likely. Funded by local club.
Fortaleza	520m (£171m)	6	4 - Likely. To large clubs draw strong crowds.
Manaus	Unkown.	4	1 - Highly unlikely. Local club draws small crowds.
Natal	Est 400-1bn (£315m)	4	2 - Unlikely. No major team for six years.
Porto Alegre	290m (£95m)	5	4 - Likely. Funded by local club.
Recife	532m (£181m)	5	1 - Highly likely. Local clubs draw large crowds.
Rio de Janeiro	1.1bn (£320m)	7	1 - Highly likely.
Salvador	592 (£192m)	6	4 - Likely. Local clubs well supported.
São Paulo	820m (£230m)	6	4 - Likely, but already three stadiums for three clubs.

Source: The Guardian. [9]

Figure 3: Comparison of cost versus future use.

Source: The Guardian.

The combination of the project size and tight schedules - FIFA unilaterally decided that stadium construction should be finished well ahead of the World Cup in time to host the Confederation Cup in 2013 - resulted in poor working conditions and worker exploitation. Reports of workers carrying 50 kilogram bags of cement, working at heights of 50 meters and putting in 84 hour weeks were not uncommon during the construction period. The General Secretary of Building Workers International, Ambert Yuson claims that "meeting FIFA deadlines [has] been fatal...for workers." However, it is strikes about safety standards, sanitation, wages and working hours have lead FIFA’s General Secretary to claim that his organisation "has been through hell."

The Secretaries' contrasting attitudes to the situation is telling - while the unions consider that FIFA deadlines cause loss of life, the implication from FIFA is that is more concerned about the time and subsequent money lost from strikes. One might ask where the government is in this equation. While there is a report of the Brazilian Labor Ministry accusing at least one major construction company of forcing workers to "live in slave-like" conditions, human rights activists have also stated that some of the larger construction firms donate large sums to political campaigns. Ergo, elected officials are "wary of criticising their records on labour rights."

A report providing an overview of World Cup projects indicates that dozens of projects were auctioned at significantly higher amounts than estimated costs accounted for, such as the Maracanã stadium. Its estimated cost was 600 million reais (approximately $320 million US). It was auctioned for 859 million, half of which was paid for by the Brazilian Development Bank. The implication is clear, the government is where FIFA and the major global sponsors want them - backing their projects regardless of the cost - both monetarily and socially - to the people of Brazil. Those constructing and producing the wealth for the minority domestic elite and international corporations, have been and continue to be excluded from enjoying it themselves.

There have been many other human rights abuses reported by various reliable sources such as the UN Special Rapporteur, Amnesty and local advocacy groups. All reinforce the notion that the Workers Party is not a party with concern for its core voter base at heart. Housing rights violations have resulted in evictions and homelessness. The militarisation of public spaces and introduction of two kilometre exclusion zones designed to favour multinational corporations come at the cost of loss of both personal freedom and local street vendor business. Even the deliberate exclusion of local communities from decision making processes directly influencing their lives and livelihoods have contributed to an overall environment of fear and persecution.

The UN Special Rapporteur revealed in 2011 that there was a "pattern of lack of transparency, consultation, dialogue, fair negotiation...concerning evictions." An estimated 250,000 people were forcibly evicted from their homes in the twelve host cities and according to affected residents, there were 21 cases of villages and favelas cleared out using war-like tactics such as destroying property and cutting public services.

In the same poll that found 61% of Brazilians thought that the World Cup was bad for their country, more than 77% also felt that their police forces are not a positive influence in their country, and just over half think the military has a negative impact on progress. Brazil has a long history of police brutality borne out of its complicated and corrupt political structure. Seen as a legacy of military dictatorships, the 1988 Brazilian constitution kept military and civilian police forces separate - and it is the military arm that, according to Fiona Macaulay, is now said to be led by former well known torturers from the military regime. Macaulay holds that "the negative effects of years of unconstrained police brutality still resonate through Brazilian society."

Thus, when millions of angry Brazilians poured into the streets to protest the litany of human rights abuses that came with the World Cup, concomitant reports of excessive police force used against the civilian population also flowed in. The Director of Amnesty Brazil has himself reported witnessing the use of tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets for the purposes of dispersing mostly peaceful crowds, and not in reaction to an immediate threat. Conversely, Rio's Secretary of Public Security claimed that the forces were just trying "to seek a compromise." The deaths and injuries resulting from such clashes suggest it was a very heavy handed compromise to seek.

The militarisation of public spaces is a genuine concern for those homeless families and street vendors banned from the two kilometre "exclusion zones" surrounding the host stadiums and policed by private security firms. The zones were created by FIFA at the behest of multinational sponsors demanding exclusive access to a captive tourist market. Concern was justified, given that the security firms answered to FIFA and not the Brazilian government and were trained by an organisation notorious for its military role in Iraq. Academi, formerly known as Blackwater has prior form when it comes to the use of excessive force.

Compared to the London Olympics in 2012 where not one worker died, and the Swedish bid for the 2020 Olympics - which has seen an agreement reached between the Swedish Olympic Committee and the national trade union centre to prevent breaches of workers’ rights - Brazil's mega-event human rights record is abysmal. However, qualified consideration may be given to the fact that Brazil is a country dealing with a complicated structure of corruption and coercion, built on a centuries old system of slavery and land theft.

It is a country that only achieved universal suffrage as recently as 1985. Following changes to voter eligibility , more than half the population of Brazil voted in the 1989 election, compared to just 2-3% between 1894 and 1926. "Low income households do not traditionally have enough education or power to participate effectively, if at all, in the political process." As a greater proportion of the population become empowered economically and socially, it is reasonable to expect that a resultant political empowerment may exert an equal force of change upon its leaders, and prevent further such abuses as are currently ocurring.

It is understandable then, that millions of Brazilians resent more than $14 billion being spent on a temporary mega-event, while they lack the basic services promised by a government calling themselves a Workers Party. It is true that the Workers Party have made some minor improvements at the boundaries - where the large multinational corporations have permitted them access. But out on the field, where the real game is played, those organisations have created an environment very specifically designed to exclude the very workers forced to build it. In order to maintain political power and influence, the Workers Party has granted generous rewards to the economic elite, while the masses have been cynically placated with subsistence handouts and failed promises.

Brazil only gained universal suffrage less than thirty years ago and the Workers Party has only been in government for less than half of that. To expect radical change to ocurr without resistance from powerful minority interests is naive. However the deaths, injuries, evictions and abuses of working and housing rights for the people of Brazil, in return for a dozen football stadiums they will have little access to or future use for, is a significantly worse pay-off than the billions of state dollars spent by a governing party claiming to represent workers. At best, what the Workers Party has done is disingenuous. At worst, it is traitorous. "There is nothing more like a Conservative than a Liberal in power."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY

Phil Bloomer and Julia Mello Neiva, “Brazil World Cup: FIFA and Business Miss an Open Goal for Human Rights.” The Guardian, (14 June 2014) http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/brazil-world-cup-fifa-business-goal-human-rights passim Accessed 22 July 2014.

Building and Wood Worker’s international, “One more worker die (sic) in FIFA World Cup 2014 Stadium.” bwint.org (09 May 2014) http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?Index=5515&Language=EN passim Accessed 22 July 2014.

Sam Brody, “A Guide to the Scandals Plaguing the World Cup.” Mother Jones, (12 June 2014) http://www.motherjones.com/media/2014/06/fifa-world-cup-scandals-brazil-qatar passim Accessed 22 July 2014

Julia Carneiro, “Brazil Security Forces Criticised Over Policing Methods.” BBC Brasil, (23 July 2014) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-23418063 passim Accessed 01 August 2014.

Andrea Dip, “Brazil’s2014 World Cup: Rights Abuses Revealed in Report.” Huffington Post (14 December 2011) passim Accessed 22 July 2014.

Economist “Serial Killing.” economist.com (20 March 2014) http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2014/03/police-violence-brazil Accessed 01 August 2014.

Ida Karlson, “World Cup Workers Struggle For Basic Rights.” Al Jazeera (03 July 2014) http://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/07/world-cup-workers-struggle-basic-rights-2014738261599591.html passim Accessed 22 July 2014

National Coalition of Local Committees for a People’s World Cup and Olympics, “Mega-Events and Human Rights Violations in Brazil – Executive Summary.” Riionwatch.org (June 2012)

http://rioonwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/2012-World-Cup-Olympics-Dossier-English.pdf Accessed 01 August 2014

Pew Research Centre, “Brazilian Discontent Ahead of World Cup.” Pew Research Centre Global Attitudes Project (03 June 2014) http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/06/03/brazilian-discontent-ahead-of-world-cup/ passim Accessed 22 July 2014.

Jonathon Watts, “World Cup 2014: Eighth Construction Worker Killed in Brazil.” The Guardian (09 May 2014) http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/09/world-cup-2014-eighth-construction-worker-killed-in-brazil passim Accessed 22 July 2014.

Jonathon Watts and Paddy Allen, World Cup 2014: Brazil’s Stadiums – Interactive.” The Guardian (16 October 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/football/interactive/2013/jun/10/world-cup-2014-brazil-stadiums-in-pictures  passim Accessed 01 August 2014

United Nations, “Brazil off-course for World Cup and Olympics – UN housing expert.” Office for the High Commission of Human Rights (26 April, 2011) http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10960&LangID=E passim Accessed 01 August 2014.

SECONDARY

Ricardo Attunes, “Global economic restructuring and the world of labor in Brazil: the challenges to trade unions and social movements.” Geoforum Volume 32, Issue 2 (2001) pp449-58

Ricardo Attunes, “Trade Unions, Social Conflict, and the Political Left in Present-Day Brazil. Between Breach and Compromise.” Chapter 11 in The New American Left: Cracks in the Empire ed. Carr, Barry; Webber, Jeffery R. (2013) pp255-75

Amado Luis Cervo, “Brazil’s Rise on the international Scene: Brazil and the World.” Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional, Volume 53, (2010) pp7-32

Monica A. Haddad. A Spatial Analysis of Bolsa Familia: Is Allocation Targeting the Needy? Chapter 10 in Brazil under Lula. ed. Joseph L. Love and Werner Bear (2010) pp187-201  http://0-www.palgraveconnect.com.alpha2.latrobe.edu.au/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9780230618374. (Accessed: 22 July 2014).

Joseph L. Love, “The Lula Government in Historical Perspective.” Chapter 16 in Brazil under Lula, ed. Joseph L. Love and Werner Bear (2009) pp305-12  http://0-www.palgraveconnect.com.alpha2.latrobe.edu.au/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9780230618374. (Accessed: 22 July 2014).

Fiona Macaulay, “Brazil: Never Again?” History Workshop Journal. Issue 72 (2011) pp275-82